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Abstract: The battle for the best knowledge representation language seems to be ter-
minated. Not because anyone had found one, but because fairly obviously there is none. 
We propose to turn our attention to general architectures of knowledge representation. If 
theories to be represented become specified, we can use such general constructs in the 
development of individual architectures. Theories are generally used by some agent for 
specific purposes. Agents need to communicate with each other, in order to make use 
of their theories. We claim that a theory of computer-agenthood should describe com-
munication and conversation among agents and the way they interact with the environ-
ment. A functional architecture for intelligent systems interconnection (ISI) is proposed. 
Subsuming functional layers of representations and theories are identified, without mak-
ing commitments for particular choices in any one layer. We attempt to show the road 
how how to bring together represented conscious and unconscious, as well as not 
represented inherent knowledge. We do it in order to combine intelligence with effective-
ness. 
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l. Introduction 
Many attempts and proposals aimed at finding a universal, "best" knowledge 
representation language. The scope is very broad and encompasses several dimensions, 
depending on the choices between procedural or declarative, intensional or extensional 
representations [21] or the choice of blending them into so called multiparadigm systems 
[3], or choosing the right expressive power. There have been tasks around for which a 
given representation language was poor and others for which it was an overkill. We need 
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to recognise that intelligent systems need more than one representation scheme. Many 
examples suggest [7, 13] that intelligent behaviour may not be achieved by single physical 
entities acting in one scene and having one single goal only. Intelligent behaviour sup-
poses, instead, controlled, self-conscious actions with appropriately concentrated or 
diversified motivations. The actions are carried out in environments possibly populated 
with other similar agents and are caused by internal acts on varying higher levels. 
Represented (conceptualised) conscious and unconscious as well as not represented but 
implemented knowledge must be brought together in order to give an account on effective 
intelligent behaviour. 
We claim that the integrated effect of mental and physical actions is decomposable 
into a cooperative function of communicating agents. Computational limitations and 
efficiency requirements do not allow one single theory to deal with real world problems in 
intelligent manner. Intelligence can only be achieved if different theories about the same 
subject matter compete. Agents, on one hand have to implement a theory of communica-
tion and conversation in order to confront the theories they represent. On the other hand an 
agent not only is a part of an environment containing other such agents, but itself must be 
treated as a possible set of cooperating subagents. 
The interconnection of agents together with the representational task is functionally 
abstracted into a multilayered architecture. We show how representational layers are 
formed in computer based implementations and how is it possible to build succeeding 
strata of theories on their top. In Section 3.1. we identify four such representational layers: 
1. Senses and actions layer. 
2. Computer representation layer. 
3. Logic representation layer. 
4. Abstractions layer. 
With the help of this the theory of the agent can be built up. The agent's theory can 
possibly be clustered, one such sub-theory being the theory of communicating agents. Sec-
tion 3.2 presents the stratification of such a theory, giving an account on: 
5. Model management layer. 
6. Situation and discourse modelling layer. 
7. Motivations and agenthood layer. 
These seven layers form the Intelligent Systems Interconnection (ISI) proposal. 
Brachman similarly stratified the possible meanings of constituents in a knowledge 
representation tool [ 4] while he investigating semantic nets. This technique was success-
fully used for representing a theory of activity and time in [18]. 
As it has already been mentioned there are no single prescribed or specific choices 
made in the general architecture. This is necessary because practically the functionality of 
every layer can be made specific depending on the actual set of agents to communicate 
through these layers. In the discourse modelling layer, for instance, different languages can 
be used (special purpose interface languages, graphic languages and last but least only 
natural language). 
In tlJe layer of logic representation(s) the chosen kind of logic cannot be frozen once 
for all. Agents should not carry the overhead of the implementations of obscure logics if 
they do not need them, but the trickiest modal logic should also be introducible into this 
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layer in case a more demanding application (agent) needs it. 
The architecture presented in this article serves two purposes. One is analysis of the 
requirements which an intelligent CAD system's central modelling language should meet. 
Here the essential intellectual activity underlying the motivations of the involved agents is 
design in a broader sense. Therefore one of the agents or a group of agents represent a 
design theory. 
The second aim is to investigate what are the useful abstractions to help us describe 
theories of intelligent agents. In this sense the present general model is an attempt. We 
hope to stimulate other people to make their criticisms and try to contribute to the formula-
tion of a more widely acceptable, well specified architecture and conceptual framework-
essential for commensurable research results in this area. 
2. Functional architecture for knowledge representation 
2.1 Implementations, representations and theories 
A CAD system must operate on the principles of a theory which gives sufficient ac-
count on (interactive) design. An implemented CAD system is at the ultimate a model of 
that theory. A theory needs a language to be represented in. In a sense, we could say that 
there is no theory without a representation language. The two, however, are different 
things which is apparent from the same theory being representable in several different 
languages. (Two theories are considered the same, if they have the same set of possible 
models in sense of model theoretic semantics [11].) 
The concepts of a possible design theory (such as models, theory of mechanical 
machines, strategies, paradigms, goals, criteria etc.) should be representable in such a 
language. The distance between the available computer languages (for possible implemen-
tation of a computer model of the design theory) and the above concepts is fairly big. 
Therefore the expressive power of the available representation languages must be extended 
with great care. There might be several reasons for us to do so, be it for extending the pos-
sible set of representable (and in their representation distinguishable) theories, or for 
reducing the complexity of the representation. A good overview of possible meanings of 
expressive power can be found in (12]. We shall collectively call them useful enrichments. 
The result of enrichment is a language, of which the concepts subsume the concepts of the 
simpler language. 
In practice the search for an adequate representation language can proceed in the 
opposite direction also. Given concepts of a theory in a language (e.g. natural) we may 
wonder about what kind of general concepts would suffice instead. Assume that we are 
able to describe the way the subsumed concepts can be used to create the subsuming ones. 
There are several ways -essentially all different kinds of abstractions. One is specialisa-
tion of subsumed concepts to form subsuming ones; another is aggregation of subsumed 
concepts into a single subsuming one; etc. (see [8] for more). 
Suppose, that we use a logic language for representation (i.e. there are axioms which 
assign truth values to the well formed formulae of the language). In this case the theory in 
question (here theory of design) should be represented in forms of axioms as well. For a 
language,, with first-order predicate calculus see for instance [6]. In case we already have a 
logic language, but its expressive power is not high enough, we can do the following: 
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a.) Extend the syntax of the language (that will need part ofb. also) 
b.) Extend the logic by 
inventing new truth values 
modifying/extending the set of independent postulates which pin down those 
well formed formulae of the language which invariably have the same truth 
value 
modifying/extending the rules of inference. 
c.) Add defined symbols to enrich the language, so that one can express the same thing 
in several different ways. 
Given the so enriched language it will be possible to express our theory in it. It is, 
however, natural to seek for some structures in the concepts of our theory and (as men-
tioned above) for layers of subsuming concepts. The language is used for creating the 
representation of a "basic theory". The concepts of such a basic theory can be utilised to 
define concepts of a theory based (layered) on it. A theory of mechanisms for example can 
be represented in terms of concepts and their epistemological relations, while a theory of 
concepts can be represented in terms of a language with an appropriate logic (see [4]). Of 
course the actual forms of definition (the different kinds of abstraction) are to be opera-
tions expressible in the basic representation language (thus determining the largest set of 
real world models our theory can possibly have, no matter what layering strategy was used 
to describe the theory). It must be noted, that concept definition is sometimes very 
demanding concerning the expressive power of the representational language. 
The layering of theories is useful, and in our view unavoidable, because of the com-
plexity and unstructuredness of the representation resulting otherwise. From the viewpoint 
of higher level (layered) theories the more basic theory's concepts can be considered as 
enrichments of the representation language, or alternatively, as just another representation 
language (provided that the underlying theory carries along all the representational 
features of the "real" representation language). The layering upwards into strata of theories 
has a counterpart downwards, where several switches of representation language take 
place before the representation is actually tied to a physical implementation. This espe-
cially holds for computer models. 
By extending the expressive power of the representation language, the completeness 
status of the language changes also. The gain of being able to say something that was 
impossible to state before should be weighted against the added complexity of theorem 
proving necessary to carry out when the represented theory is set to work. One attempt to 
trim the trade-off is discussed in [5]. 
We think that the decision on what order of logic and what kind of modalities to 
include depends on the complexity of the conceptual relations within a problem area. The 
abstraction techniques for defining new concepts based on known ones have for instance 
an important effect. 
Care must be taken also, because the decision has consequences to the applicable 
inference control strategies as well. In one case one might wish to get guaranteed response 
within predictable time for specific problems. In other situations, like searching for an 
adequate assembly which satisfies given functional constraints, we need to contend with a 
relaxation strategy or appropriate heuristics. The complexity of this second task is a result 
of functional abstraction in the reasoning process. 
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Consequently representation languages of different agents can and in fact must be 
different. Applicable inference control strategies are also problem- or situation-dependent 
and thus not common to all agents. 
The functional architecture of agents in general must be layered for reasons of 
- gaining the appropriate expressive power and system qualities, 
- mastering the complexity of the agent's theory. 
From the above discussion it seems natural to admit the multiple agent assumption 
(i.e. agents should consist of multiple subagents): only competing theories of the real 
world can resolve the antagonism of the need to deal with complicated problems and the 
need to act in limited time. Let us call the users of the theories in question agents. The 
agents, having to compete with each other, need to implement a theory about themselves 
(i.e. a psychology). This is what enables them to reason about activities and knowledge of 
their own. (Accepting agents as implemented psychological theories follows [7].) Com-
petition involves at least two parties, so the reasoning has to cover activities and 
knowledge of the opposite parties as well. Therefore the multiple agent assumption must 
be accompanied by a theory of the communication of such agents. Information exchange 
with the rest of the environment through perception and manipulation should also be 
accounted for. For purposes of design theory (see [20]) only a limited ability of communi-
cation is needed, if compared with such "societal" communication behaviour as learning, 
teaching, or negotiating and other fancier conversation situations. 
It is instructive to look at the representational problem from the point of view of 
conversation theory [9, 15-17] where the representation of an agent's theory is not only 
related to the communication channel through which conversation with other agents can 
take place, but also to the agent's perception and motoric system. We think that the much 
argued question of whether intelligent beings "really" use representations or representa-
tions are only external observers' fabrications, may become a non-issue in this light. The 
world "really" becomes meaningless in this question, since the use of representations is 
optional for a large part of the theories. If an interrelated set of attributes of biological or 
artificial structures can be accepted as a model for a theory, then tokens of that theory do 
not need intermediate representations. Electric impulses in a computer just happen to per-
sist without being represented in the computer itself, but that does not exclude the possibil-
ity of representing impulses as concepts in a computer simulation language. On the other 
hand the representation of the impulses in a computer becomes a self-knowledge only if 
the mapping from the theory of electric impulses to the real impulses can directly or 
indirectly be established. The presented arguments can be applied to the mapping function 
as well: it should be an attribute of the agent - not necessarily represented but by all 
means exhibited. The mapping function can be implemented directly through identity 
relations or indirectly through sensory means. In the light of this discussion we see that 
the need for a particular agent to have representations of unconscious concepts depends on 
the physical quality of the agent (flesh and blood, wires and n-p transitions etc.). An agent 
can act without representing the act itself, but hardly can reason about the act without hav-
ing represented it first (be the "act" physical or mental). 
Since percepts and manipulative capabilities of present day computers are desperately 
limited (see efforts for getting off the ground in [14]), the reinforcement between represen-
tations and real world models in computers lies quite ahead in time. 
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It would be interesting to find real world models where the representation of percepts 
and of motoric controls were identical to the percepts and controls. Example: if an esta-
blished connection causing a motoric action is at the same time the implementation of the 
action's conceptual representation. 
The lowest level of an agent's functional architecture is thus the sensimotoric layer 
(interpreted in CAD as the implementing computer together with its I/O system). Through 
this layer can denotations finally get connected to the real world and not to artifact models. 
The whole theory of design (just as our human knowledge about the surrounding 
world) will not be able to rely entirely on such first hand denotations, but on knowledge 
engineered, human made, built-in representations or to some extent on "second-hand" 
denotations acquired through communication with other agents (including humans). The 
semantic integrity of the CAD system will, on the ground of the previous reasons, rely on 
the users and maintainers of the system. 
2.2 Choices in the general architecture 
The presented views allow for a multitude of different types of knowledge represen-
tation systems to be built (and thus theories to be represented). One aspect of the permis-
siveness lies in the allowable physical architectures. If we consider agents as autonomous 
systems, this autonomy is always relative to the environment, i.e. the only thing common 
to two agents is their environment. But exactly in computer based implementations the 
definition of what should be considered as environment is left to us (the external 
observers). 
The trivial implementation is to use separate computers for separate agents and con-
nect those machines. It is also possible to implement agents in a multitask environment 
and provide intertask communication. Even one language with coroutining possibility can 
be considered environment. The need for parallel processing for agents depends on the 
discourse situations they are expected to enter. Many discourse situations can essentially 
be described without using parallelism. We think, that future CAD systems will need a lit-
tle more than that: a sequentially described discourse between agents may do, but in-
between agents should be capable of processing in parallel (e.g. a human user plus the 
interface to the human user as one agent and other agents of the CAD system). 
The choice of representation language remains with the agent itself, and is basically 
dependent on the agent's theory. Even on the level of equivalent expressive power there 
are basic choices, which influence the effectivity and the maintainability of the agent's 
representation of its theory. In general we expect an agent not only to represent its theory 
in a static way, but also its functions: e.g. a simulator program should represent both the 
target of simulation (say a conveyor) and also the functions of the simulator (say being 
able to gather statistics). If so, the control of the theorem proving task (or equivalent pro-
cedure) must also be representable in general. Different kinds of conceptual dependencies, 
like abstractions, can have an important role in reasoning. Inheritance is one special kind 
of inference that may need control. 
For the design of a representational language, the language concepts should form an 
orthogonal system. The same holds for independent theory-layers. Orthogonality assures 
locality of effects caused by modification and causes longer life expectations and less vul-
nerability for a system in general. Orthogonality is defined here as both of the following 
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criteria being met: 
meaningful transformations on the data in that layer should be expressible using 
combinations of the functions in that layer (completeness criterion of the func-
tions), whereas 
combinations of functions within one layer must not be restricted but by the 
meaning of the composite transformation that the combination is intended to 
perform, e.g. no restriction from lower level layers (of implementation or 
theory) is permitted to penetrate the layer in question - unless this restriction is 
functional (independency criterion). 
3. A layered knowledge representation architecture 
3.1 Intra agent representation of knowledge 
We identified layers 1-4 in the functional architecture of an agent. 
The Senses and Actions layer is responsible in the end for the computer interpretation 
of the agent's theory. Any theory in the layer's language will be related to the computer's 
pieces, states and relations over pieces and states, including the tokens of information 
passing through the I/O system of the computer (procedural primitives for locomotion and 
other motoric, as well as manipulative functions over manipulables, and means for sensing 
and creating implementations of messages, implementations of memory and primitives for 
learning and unlearning - if appropriate). There is no unique set of canonical primitives; 
it all depends on the "creature". 
In computer systems this heterogeneous representational vehicle is a sort of assembly 
language which directly- relates to the physical parts of the machine: I/O registers, 
memory, interrupts, graphic I/O, etc. In order to hide all this from the higher level 
representational tasks, these things are abstracted into a general purpose representation 
language (high level programming language). 
The Layer of Computer Representations is built on top of the former one and features 
everything that is necessary from the point of view of good software engineering. It sup-
ports good system design and maintenance practices and makes it possible for computer 
based systems to survive their original implementation environment. The change to this 
higher level of representation layer improves systems qualities and at the same time 
expressive power can also be added (e.g. emulation of parallel computation on sequential 
machines). 
While the concern for introducing a new layer on top of layer 1 was "good engineer-
ing", tuning the knowledge representation language to the needs of an agent may require 
the introduction of a third layer with adequate expressive power and computational 
efficiency. 
We call this the Layer of Logic Representations because it is straightforward to com-
pare knowledge representation languages by formulating their logic. This is not to say that 
the representation language of every agent must by all means be a logic language. 
Especially in this layer it is necessary to maintain extensibility of the language: the 
completeness criterion of orthogonality will take care of not building in theories into the 
representation language, while the independency criterion separates representational issues 
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from inference control. The representation should not know about the inference control 
and the inference control mechanism(s) must not know anything specific from the 
representations (except what the possible inference operations are). Heuristics should be 
separated from general inference control functions. 
In addition, in multiparadigm systems the automatic propagation of propositions 
among representational parts goes along with limitations in expressive power, but the 
behaviour of the system is predictable. If we tolerate the inconsistency between parts, we 
can circumvent these limitations but only at the cost of unpredictability in general (task-
specific debugging of representations). 
Augmenting the richness of the representation language by abstractions is a common 
way and has much been discussed by different authors [4, 8]. The layer of Abstractions 
enriches the language by defining conceptual dependencies (such as aggregation, generali-
sation, etc.) needed to economically express theories. The expressive power of the 
language is not effected, for the definition of these conceptual dependencies would other-
wise have not been possible. 
3.2 Intelligent Systems Interconnection (Inter-Agent Communication) 
Layering can be continued in many different directions, depending on the actual 
theory to be built up. Additional system layers are called layers of theories. After realising 
that we need multiple agents in order to implement intelligent systems which cope with 
real world problems (e.g. Intelligent CAD systems), we must consider how they are inter-
connected. Any agent taking part in the communication should have a sub-theory of com-
munication which is valid for the given "society" of agents. This sub-theory is a possibly 
multilayered architecture of theories, generally accepted by all the participants (general 
architecture). The value· of general architectures (such as the famous ISO-OSI model [22]) 
convinces us of the utility of putting considerable effort into the elaboration of such frame-
work for the interconnection of intelligent agents. 
Stated in a simplified way, the intelligent systems interconnection (ISI) architecture 
should be a framework for the description of how intelligent agents talk to each other. The 
approach of the architecture is functional, allowing space for different specific cases as 
well as for variations in the actual implementations. For practical purposes we need to 
limit the generality of the architecture to the needs of interconnecting agents within a CAD 
system (including users as agents). It should be noted, however, that not every aspect of 
information exchange can be accounted for by communicating via language discourses. 
Sometimes a common referential model is also needed to which both agents can point to. 
If an agent's theory is complete, it has not too much to communicate with others. 
This is (especially in CAD) not the case: incomplete theories ("models of the solution") 
must be dealt with. The Layer of Model Management could be the basis for dealing with 
incomplete information, building alternative approaches and representing assumptions. In 
a given moment several (maybe even contradictory) states of affairs can be accepted as 
attainable by augmenting the agent's knowledge. Information exchange among agents 
needs to be accompanied by the agent's possibility to reason about the effects of receiving 
new information and reason about what acts can be taken to get some new information. 
Notunonotonic assumptions can help the agent in that reasoning. In the end, these 
assumptions should be checked by directly consulting the real world (through 
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manipulations and percepts - e.g. a CAD system for programs could run the program and 
measure its performance), or asking other agents about the status of the given assumption. 
It is also possible that the underlying theory is not complete. Exchanging theories among 
agents is a most interesting phenomenon (learning, unlearning, reinterpretation, etc.) a part 
of which can be described by conversation theory [15-17]. 
Using the theory of multiple models, a theory comparted in the Situation and 
Discourse Modelling Layer could be worked out. We think that conversation theory pro-
vides substantial basic material for working out this layer's exact specification. 
The present layer introduces the notion of situation. It should provide concepts 
which describe, how situations are effected by actions and communication. Conversation, 
data capturing and interpretation, message generation, and other actions all influence 
- the models of the situations 
- the models underlying the situations. 
These concepts can be used to talk about the roles, goals and motivations of an agent. 
So again we can work out a layered theory which sits on top of the former. We call this 
new layer Layer of Motivations and Agenthood. Primitives of self-knowledge [7] could be 
defined, for self-reference and reference to other agents in their quality of being imple-
mented psychological theories. The agent can take acts rooted, via conceptual or direct 
links, in the senses and actions layer. Whenever the theory of agenthood proves an act, this 
act (by the agent) takes place. 
The multiple models of the model management layer make it possible to divide the 
agent into sub-agents, and let them have their own theories of the subject matter. The 
theory of agenthood can use the situation modelling layer's theory to model the fact, that 
not only one agent is acting on his behalf. 
Language understanding and generation is one of the very complex acts that an agent 
can indulge in. Potentially every layer of theories as well as representations can take part 
in it. Understanding and generation is not a function defined in one of the layers. It is 
rather a part of the total architecture. The roots are in the senses and actions layer for per-
ception and articulation and the results are used by higher level actions. Such actions can 
be for example morphological or syntactic transformations. The agent is allowed to use 
representations, as in analysis using symbolic computations. In other cases he may not 
make use of them, as in construction based on memory. (Note, that memory is not neces-
sarily representational.) 
Higher level semantic functions carried out on concepts have a place in the basic 
theory-layer (model management). Some semantic functions require the use of situations 
for understanding and selecting adequate response (thus should be defined in that layer). 
Interactions of discourses and motivations, on the other hand, go into the layer above 
(motivations and agenthood). 
In the same way that different theories call for different representations, there should 
not be a single language for communication, either. Humans also, beside using natural 
language, make use of several different sorts of languages, be them graphical, written or 
spoken, general purpose, or tightly coupled to a discipline. 
Some interaction between agents does not need the highest level functions of these, 
and evelf mere context-free question-answering can take us far enough for exchanging 
information between compatible but incomplete representations of the agent's theories. In 
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the other extreme we take into account all the aspects of the communication. These are 
the syntactic construct, the functional structure (how it conveys the semantic information) 
and the interstructural aspect (how it functions in the given communication situation) [10]. 
In practical CAD projects (until appropriate theories are worked out) substantial 
simplification is necessary. The communication between agents (especially those which 
are built out of extant tools) .can be managed by a "design manager", which possesses a 
"general model" as in the General Modeling System in [2] or a metamodel" as in the 
Integrated Data Description Schema of the IIICAD system [20]. The design manager, 
implemented as an agent, represents all the relevant information about the object of 
design, and works basically in query answering mode with other agents (or slightly gen-
eralised, he acts as a moderator-mediator between agents). 
To simplify matters it is possible to accept the representation language of the design 
manager as a language for communication also. In that case the specific ISI implementa-
tion will have much in common with the representational architecture of the "design 
manager". While agents in general represent their theories about the target of design, the 
design manager will represent a theory of design (for details see [19]). 
The layers to build on top of the representational ones ( 1-4) must therefore contain a 
theory of design evolution [20]. A sub-theory of it should describe the communication 
between the agents, or at least between any agent and the design manager. 
Conclusion 
a.) We argued that intelligent agents should be decomposable into interconnected agents. 
Each of them should have it's own theory, representation language and specific 
implementational details. 
b.) We proposed a functional layering approach for knowledge representation with four 
layers of representation and three for one particular theory, that of communication. 
Layering the knowledge representation architecture is not a goal per se. Switching 
representation languages once or more times could be replaced if appropriate technol-
ogy was available for different implementations. Layering of theories is much more 
inherent in the knowledge to be captured, because of the basic complexity of concep-
tual structures. 
c.) We also proposed that conversation theory could be incorporated into this multilay-
ered architecture and provide artificial agents with the possibility of directly relating 
their theories to the real world (not only to theories of other agents). 
d.) We conclude, that intelligent CAD systems should be integrated in the following 
way. 
d. l.) Create computer based agents which contain different extant CAD tools. 
d.2.) Represent the theory of the tool incorporated by the agent. 
d.3.) In every agent implement the same the01y of communicating agents. 
d.4.) Implement a design manager agent. 
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